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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution is the fundamental law of the United States of
America. Drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, in 1787, it is the world’s oldest and still valid written
constitution.1 While it is common knowledge that the words “local
government” and “home rule” do not appear in the text of the Constitution,
it is incorrect to conclude that the drafters of the Constitution did not value
decentralization or local governance. To this day, real American daily life
at the local level is alive and well. After all, we live, work and die in cities
or towns across these United States. Cities are the most networked and
interconnected of our political organizations. They govern through

*

Professor of the Practice of Governance at the University of Southern California Sol Price
School of Public Policy and three-term Mayor and Council Member in the City of Rolling
Hills Estates, California.
1. See Johnny H. Killian, Constitution of the United States, U.S. S. (1994),
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
[https://perma.cc/74ULTLWK].
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collaboration and pragmatism to solve real public-administration problems
at the local level.2 This article reviews the evolution of municipal
corporations and the innovations that make them special in the art and
science of local governance.
The concept of decentralized governance finds its roots in the Articles of
Confederation, which, of course, predates the U.S. Constitution and the Bill
of Rights.3 Article II of the Articles of Confederation declares that “each
state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States, in Congress assembled.”4 Similarly, the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”5 Because the Tenth
Amendment was a natural progression of that for which the Federalists had
argued and advocated during the adoption of the Constitution,6 James
Madison faced no opposition in proposing it. Reading this Amendment in
the context of the Age of Enlightenment provides the strongest evidence that
the drafters very much intended to bring government closest to the people
and away from a central form of authority. French, English, and American
political philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, John Locke, and
Thomas Paine, authored many writings during this period against
authoritarian government and for representative government.7 In fact, these
concerns about centralized versus decentralized powers came about mainly
because of colonial America’s experience in which most people interacted
with their local officials.8 This special experience was observed by Alexis
De Tocqueville, who coined the term “American Exceptionalism.”9 In 2017,
not much has changed. The level of government that interacts the most with
2. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD 4 (2013).
3. See
Founding
Documents
and
Resources,
B. OF RTS. INST.,
https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents [https://perma.cc/36MY-D88S].
See generally MILESTONES: 1776–1783: Articles of Confederation, 1777–1781, OFFICE OF
THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/articles
[https://perma.cc/7THX-4Z8Z].
4. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”).
7. See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776). See generally Eiichi Shimomissé, The
Philosophies of Enlightenment, CTR. FOR PHILOSOPHY & PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES
(1997), http://www.csudh.edu/phenom_studies/western/lect_8.html [https://perma.cc/DNQ7TL2W].
8. See generally EARNEST S. GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD (1972).
9. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36 (1840).
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citizens through municipal departments, public schools, and various special
districts is still exceptional and is very much local.10
The drafters of the Constitution understood that a broader national
authority would destroy local interests. They worked to create a functional
republican structure strong enough to enforce national interests but limited
enough to assure individual self-determination where citizens lived and
worked.11 Madison summarized this concept as “the necessity of providing
more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation
of Justice.”12 At the Constitutional Convention, Madison unsuccessfully
argued that the U.S. Congress should have power to veto state laws.
Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, concerned with the mighty power of
the national government, wrote that state legislatures in such instances
should “sound the alarm to the people” and serve as the “jealous guardians
of the rights of citizens.”13 The controversy about the appropriate division
of power between the federal government and the states still rages today, but
there is no question that the drafters of the Constitution agreed on the wisdom
of dividing power both among branches of government and within those
branches of government.14 That division is reflected today in the
constitutions of all fifty states, where local governments find their voice in
home rule, or what has generically become the concept of local control, one
state constitution at a time.15 Simply stated, home rule refers to the power
of a local municipality to set up its own system or charter of self-government
as opposed to receiving that charter from the state.16
This eight-part Article discusses the historical evolution of the municipal
corporation, the nuances of self-governance, California law on municipal

10. See Speak Out, ANNENBERG CLASSROOM, http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/
speakout/how-does-local-government-affect-you [https://perma.cc/EE4L-C5LA].
11. The U.S. Constitution grants very limited powers to the federal government. Instead,
the Tenth Amendment reserves authority-giving powers to states. To describe local
governments today is to speak of fifty different legal and political organizations.
12. See Madison Debates–June 6, THE AVALON PROJECT (June 6, 1787), http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_606.asp [https://perma.cc/4B2J-X9CE].
13. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2573 (2012) (“The
Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing. They gave
Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction would
undermine the principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited and
enumerated powers.”).
15. See Local Government Authority, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/buildskills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-powers/local-government-authority
[https://perma.cc/52JW-ELXT].
16. Home Rule Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/h/
home-rule/ [https://perma.cc/44FE-ENZC].
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affairs, and California-centric innovations in governance.17 Part I describes
the historical context for local governance, which has led to home rule not
only in California but also across the nation. In Part II, the Article dives right
into the discussion of home rule in the context of the legal entity known in
California as charter law cities. Part III distinguishes charter law cities from
the overwhelming majority of city structures in California, known as general
law cities, which also enjoy home rule through what is commonly referred
to as police power. In Part IV, the Article defines and draws distinctions
between governance models known in California as independent or contract
cities. Part V focuses on the innovation in governance known in California
as the Lakewood Plan, which facilitates the governance model of contract
cities. Parts VI and VII provide a general discussion of guiding principles in
management and uniform laws applicable to municipalities, and the Article
winds down in Part VIII by examining tax matters and infrastructure finance
tools unique to California.
I. HISTORY OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Until about the mid to late nineteenth century, the powers given to local
governments through state constitutions remained untested. The general
interpretation of a local government’s authority in early 1800s was
unchallenged in the courts and was, therefore, under a state government’s
discretion. State’s interpretations became the subject matter of litigation in
the late 1800s. Two separate rulings, one from Iowa and the other from
Michigan, framed two diametrically opposed viewpoints. In 1868, Judge
John F. Dillon of Iowa affirmed a narrow interpretation of a local
government’s authority,18 holding that municipalities maintain a subordinate
status within the state because, as a rule, they get their specific powers from
the state. Therefore, in the absence of specific provisions increasing their
power, municipalities are subject to state legislative control. This view
became known as Dillon’s Rule. In contrast, in 1871, Judge Thomas Cooley
of the Michigan Supreme Court challenged Dillon’s Rule,19 holding that
municipalities possess inherent rights to local self-governance. Taking a
more populist view, Judge Cooley reasoned that “local governments . . . are
either simultaneous with, or precede, the more central authority” and that, if
Dillon’s Rule were publicly asserted, it “would be somewhat startling to our
people.”20 However, the Cooley view of local government power as an
absolute right never gained much acceptance and was, in fact, discredited by

17. The selection of California law is purely the personal choice of the author, a California
lawyer and a California public servant.
18. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
19. People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 109 (1871).
20. See id. at 100.
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the United States Supreme Court. In 1903 and again in 1923, the Court
upheld Dillon’s Rule.21 In the years following those decisions, with few
exceptions, state law restricted municipal powers to those “explicitly
granted,” “necessarily or fairly implied,” or “essential” to accomplish the
purposes of the municipality.22
The evolution of Dillon’s Rule restricted home rule, requiring states to
explicitly grant power to cities through state constitutions or subsequent
legislation. In practice, today Dillon’s Rule is fully implemented in the
overwhelming majority of states, which create through their constitutions the
power for local self-governance by a local charter.23 State provisions for
home rule are specifically defined by each state’s constitution or, in states
like California, by additional statutes enacted by that state’s legislature. In
California, home rule applies to what California labels as charter law cities.24
All states grant cities and counties the ability to administer their
municipalities at the local level through either the state constitution or
government code. These provisions set forth the powers of cities and
counties to organize under the laws of the state as a municipal corporation.
For example, California provides for two types of municipal corporations:
charter cities and general law cities.25 The California Constitution prescribes
a uniform procedure for the formation of charter cities, while statutes in the
California Government Code provide the procedure for the formation of
general law cities.26 The basic difference between general law and charter
law cities is the degree of control that the state government may exercise
over them. Because charter cities are granted the authority of home rule and
the right to craft their own charters, they enjoy more freedom than general
law cities to innovate and to pass ordinances according to local need.

21. Dillon’s Rule is within the mainstream of American judicial and academic sentiment.
See, e.g., 2 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4:3 (3d ed.);
Gerald E. Drug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (1980).
22. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 221 (1903); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Lennane v. City of
Detroit, 196 N.W. 391, 392 (Mich. 1923). These cases uphold Dillon’s Rule and its purpose
to restrict municipal powers to those explicitly granted.
23. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 15.
24. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a) (West 2016) (“For its own government, a county or city
may adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors voting on the question. The charter is
effective when filed with the Secretary of State. A charter may be amended, revised, or
repealed in the same manner. A charter, amendment, revision, or repeal thereof shall be
published in the official state statutes. County charters adopted pursuant to this section shall
supersede any existing charter and all laws inconsistent therewith. The provisions of a charter
are the law of the State and have the force and effect of legislative enactments.”).
25. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI (West 2016).
26. General law cities operate under California Government Code Title 4 (commencing
with § 34000) and other applicable California laws. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 23000
et seq. (West 1947); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34000 et seq. (West 1949).
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Nevertheless, in practice general law cities also have considerable choice
in the management of their local affairs. Article XI, Section 7 of the current
California Constitution provides a general grant of inherent local powers to
every city without regard to its status as a charter or general law city.27 Some
refer to this as the police power or even home rule.28 In fact, absent a clear
indication of preemptive intent from the California Legislature, cities are
granted clear powers to regulate land use and other matters linked to this
police power.29 Because the state Constitution and Legislature have tended
to give general law cities similar management control over local matters as
they have to charter cities, the original distinction between the two forms of
city authority has been somewhat blurred in California.
In light of the advancement of general law in Government Code sections,
developing jurisprudence, and legislative power granted to municipalities to
manage local affairs, most cities, in practice, are general law cities. They opt
out of home rule under a charter to save on the administrative cost of
establishing and maintaining the charter. This ratio is supported by the data
in California, where 121 cities out of 482 total California cities operate under
chartered home rule.30 With a handful of exceptions, charter law cities in
California were either incorporated before 1960 or are larger cities with
average population sizes over 100,000 residents.
However, a
disproportionate amount of Californians live in charter cities, including Los
Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, Santa Clara, Sacramento, and San
Francisco.31
The first California Constitution was adopted in November of 1849 in
advance of California attaining statehood in the United States.32 The first
incorporated charter city in California was the city of San Francisco,
incorporated February 18, 1850, followed by Sacramento on February 27,
27. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI § 7 (West 2016).
28. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI (West 2016); Kourtney Burdick et al., The Origins
of California City Powers, WESTERN CITY, Jan. 2008, http://www.westerncity.com/WesternCity/January-2008/The-Origins-of-California-City-Powers/ [https://perma.cc/5JGL-T2F4].
29. City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 56 Cal. 4th
729, 742-43 (2013). It is worthy of note that this case involves the regulatory legislation of a
charter city, since charter cities as well as general law cities exercise home rule under the
inherent police power granted to all cities by Article XI, § 7. In other words, the City of
Riverside did not rely on its status as a charter city under Article XI, § 5, but, rather, on its
home rule authority under Article XI, § 7.
30. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a) (West 2016); Charter Cities List, LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES,
http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-Section/CharterCities/Charter_Cities-List [https://perma.cc/C32C-ZRW8] (Nov. 13, 2016).
31. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 30.
32. Constitutions, CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/collections/
constitutions [https://perma.cc/3SN7-L3UN]; California Admission Day September 9, 1850,
CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=23856
[https://perma.cc/3EEM-HWN2].
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both San Diego and San Jose on March 27, 1850, and Los Angeles on April
4, 1850.33 Among the last few incorporated resort or tourist-driven charter
cities in California are Big Bear Lake and Solvang, incorporated in 1980 and
1985, respectively.34 They are atypical as charter cities for their size and
population. The last city incorporated in the state of California, on July 1,
2011, was the city of Jurupa Valley in Riverside County.35 Wildomar is a
general law city, joining the ranks of a substantial majority of cities in
California.
California general law cities can always seek to transform themselves into
charter law cities, embracing more control through the adoption of a charter
in municipal elections. However, these instances are rare. Recent ballot
initiative attempts to transform general law cities to charter law cities have
seen mixed results in California. Some, like the city of Vista, have
succeeded, while others, like Rancho Palos Verdes and Costa Mesa, have
failed miserably in municipal elections for political reasons.36 In the latter
examples, cities very publicly drafted charters to bypass the public
contracting code to procure public contracts or limit public pension liabilities
but were opposed by public service unions. These unions’ political muscle
in California was not to be underestimated.37
Although political tensions over who should exercise power to govern
local jurisdictions are not new, many local government officials in both
charter and general law cities still subscribe to the view that they, rather than

33. See California Cities by Incorporation Date, CAL. ASS’N OF LOCAL AGENCY
FORMATION COMM'NS 1, 6 (Mar. 2011), http://calafco.org/resources/incorporated-cities/
california-cities-incorporation-date [https://perma.cc/73YA-5M72]; LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES,
supra note 30.
34. See ASS’N OF LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMM'NS, supra note 33, at 1; LEAGUE OF
CAL. CITIES, supra note 30.
35. See ASS’N OF LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMM'NS, supra note 33, at 1; LEAGUE OF
CAL. CITIES, supra note 30.
36. Melissa Pamer, Voters Dump Proposal to Make RPV a Charter City, PASADENA STARNEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/general-news/20110309/updatedvoters-dump-proposal-to-make-rpv-a-charter-city [https://perma.cc/PN4W-SMGT]; Stephen
Tedesco et al., California Supreme Court Rules That State’s Prevailing Wage Law Is Not
Quite So Prevailing: Charter Cities Need Not Require Prevailing Wages on Publicly Funded
Municipal Construction Projects, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (July 12, 2012),
https://www.littler.com/california-supreme-court-rules-state%E2%80%99s-prevailing-wage
-law-not-quite-so-prevailing-charter-cities [https://perma.cc/EU8R-UQS5]; Voters Reject
Charter City Plan, STATE BLDG. & CONSTR. TRADE COUNCIL OF CAL. (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://www.sbctc.org/doc.asp?id=182 [https://perma.cc/H6BY-5H2K]; Bradley Zint, City
Charter Measure Soundly Rejected by Costa Mesa Voters, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/city-charter-soundly-rejected-by-costa-mesa
-voters.html [https://perma.cc/HMH6-C8HL].
37. Kevin Dayton, How Unions Undermined the Rights of California’s Charter Cities,
UNION WATCH (Mar. 28, 2016), http://unionwatch.org/union-backed-california-law-mayscuttle-financing-of-sacramento-infill-project [https://perma.cc/M9FY-EZLG].
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the state, are best equipped to learn the needs of their constituents and
respond to those needs in their own municipalities. This view creates a
certain degree of tension between members of various city councils in
California and their state representatives, some of whom rise from the ranks
of local governments. For example, in 2011 the state of California abolished
more than four hundred redevelopment agencies, using local redevelopment
funds to help close a budget gap that the state itself had created by failing to
exercise fiscal restraint in times of diminished revenues.38 The California
Supreme Court sided with the state, inflicting a major blow to local
redevelopment agencies authorized by law since 1945.39 Cities felt betrayed
by their own representatives who voted to abolish this long established
policy favoring redevelopment.40 The exercise of this state power at the
expense of local power has damaged the relationship of local and state
officials, who collectively continue to work toward reconciliation.
II. CALIFORNIA’S CHARTER LAW CITY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
SOVEREIGNTY IN MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS
California’s charter law is an explicit grant of power to manage municipal
affairs at the very local level.41 While general law cities enjoy a certain
amount of home rule through the constitutional grant of police power, charter
law cities enjoy more freedom because they are permitted to write their own
charters to shape their styles of governance and, more importantly, cater to
their local needs. In addition, charters allow cities to declare supremacy over
their municipal affairs.
The issue of what constitutes a municipal affair in California remains very
much in a state of flux, adding to the political tensions experienced by local
and state officials. The original California Constitution does not appear to be
too concerned with the appropriate management structure of a municipality
and, thus, does not reference the term at all. Recognizing the absence of any
guidance on the topic by the Constitution, the California Supreme Court
practically described what became Dillon’s Rule a few years after California
adopted its Constitution. The California Supreme Court held that “local
governments derive their powers from the paramount political head, which
while it cedes to certain local agents certain powers, does not thereby remit
its rightful and ultimate dominion.”42
The California Constitution of 1879 remedied a number of shortcomings
of the first state constitution, including this lack of guidance. Article XI

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Cal. Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 253 (2011).
See id. at 245.
See id. at 262.
See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
Pattison v. Bd. of Supervisors, 13 Cal. 175, 184 (1859).
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clearly grants charter cities supreme authority over their municipal affairs so
that their laws regarding municipal affairs trump state law:43 “[c]ities and
towns hereafter organized under charters framed and adopted by authority of
this Constitution are hereby empowered . . . to make and enforce all laws and
regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and
limitations provided in theirs several charters.”44
In 1899 the California Supreme Court explained that charter provisions
were “enacted upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better
what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give that
municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation
which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.”45
Instead of explicitly defining municipal affair, the California Constitution
provides a set of core issues that fall under this category.46 For example, a
city charter may establish the city’s election dates, rules, and criteria for
elected office holders and procedures, including elections held at large or by
district.47 A charter may allow public financing of elections and establish
criteria for vacating and terminating municipal offices.48 A charter may
establish council salaries and quorum requirements, except when particular
laws require a supermajority vote. A local charter may prescribe ethics and
conflicts rules, including rules on incompatible offices.49 Charter cities also
have broader taxation and assessment powers than general law cities, subject
to the limitation of Proposition 218 (discussed later in this Article).50 Charter
cities may draft zoning ordinances inconsistent with the local general plan

43. See Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th 389, 399 (1992).
44. CAL. CONST. of 1879 art. XI, § 6.
45. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387 (1899).
46. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b) (“It shall be competent in all city charters to provide, in
addition to those provisions allowable by this Constitution, and by the laws of the State for:
(1) the constitution, regulation, and government of the city police force (2) subgovernment in
all or part of a city (3) conduct of city elections and (4) plenary authority is hereby granted,
subject only to the restrictions of this article, to provide therein or by amendment thereto, the
manner in which, the method by which, the times at which, and the terms for which the several
municipal officers and employees whose compensation is paid by the city shall be elected or
appointed, and for their removal, and for their compensation, and for the number of deputies,
clerks and other employees that each shall have, and for the compensation, method of
appointment, qualifications, tenure of office and removal of such deputies, clerks and other
employees.”). See also Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 398 (concluding that state law on elections did
not preclude the City of Los Angeles from adopting and enforcing provisions of its campaign
reform ballot (Measure H) initiative under its charter).
47. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10101 et seq. (West 2016); 82 CAL.
ATT’Y GEN. OP. NO. 98-1010 (Feb. 4, 1999).
48. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b); Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 392 (1992).
49. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53234 (West 2007). See generally
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53235 (West 2007).
50. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC, § 2.
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(unless, of course, consistency requirements are adopted by the charter or
ordinance).51 In other words, the local charter is the supreme authority for
municipal affairs relevant to that local jurisdiction.
While the California Supreme Court has echoed the Government Code in
some respects, holding that the topics above are municipal affairs, the legal
construction of this term remains a challenge in California.52 The definition
typically revolves around a distinction between municipal affairs and
statewide concerns, such as transportation or utilities.53 Thus, when deciding
whether a city ordinance is valid, courts consistently determine whether (1)
the local regulation or ordinance is a municipal affair, upon which the
municipality has the exclusive authority to regulate or (2) whether the subject
is a matter of statewide concern such that state legislation preempts any
municipal attempt at lawmaking.54 However, because the California
Constitution does not specifically define municipal affairs, the California
Supreme Court views the question to be decided on the facts of each case.55
According to the Court, the concept of municipal affairs is fluid and may
change over time. Issues that are municipal affairs today could become areas
of statewide concern in the future. Therefore, it remains to be seen if the
California Supreme Court will change course from a case-by-case review of
municipal affairs and give direct meaning to the Municipal Affairs Clause of
1896.
A fairly recent and well-reasoned Pepperdine Law Review article
encourages the California Supreme Court to bring clarity to the Municipal
Affairs Clause and interpret the clause:
[B]ased upon the people’s intent . . . Guided by the text, purpose, and
political theory of the Municipal Affairs Clause, the court has the obligation
to preserve California’s system of divided sovereignty and ensure that the
people’s right to local self-government is preserved by the constitution they
have framed for its preservation.56

This legal indecision about the Municipal Affairs Clause also creates
political tensions, most notably over cities’ treatment of public contracts and
the payment of prevailing wages. Some courts have exempted charter cities

51. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65803 (West 2016).
52. See, e.g., State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th
547, 552 (2012); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 6-7 (1991); Bishop
v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d. 56, 61-62 (1969).
53. See, e.g., City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th at 552; City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d at 6-7; City of San
Jose, 1 Cal. 3d. at 61-62 .
54. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d at 61-62; Brett A. Stroud, Preserving Home Rule: The Text,
Purpose, and Political Theory of California’s Municipal Affairs Clause, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 587,
604 (2014).
55. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a); City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d at 61-62.
56. Stroud, supra note 54, at 631.
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from complying with the Public Contracting Code provisions for bidding
procedures, reasoning that a city charter may exempt the city from such
statutes if the subject matter of the bid is deemed to be a municipal affair.57
Perhaps even more importantly, courts have held that charter cities are not
bound by prevailing wage or living wage laws unless they adapt them
voluntarily in their charters or laws, as some cities like Los Angeles and San
Jose have done.58 So long as a project is both a municipal affair and not
funded by state or federal grants, a charter city may choose to not pay
prevailing wages to complete a municipal project.59 However, there is a
growing argument among state elected officials that the payment of
prevailing wages is a matter of statewide concern, as are traffic and vehicle
regulations, tort claims against governments, and school regulations.60
In July of 2012 the California Supreme Court dealt a significant blow to
this argument in its long-awaited decision of State Building and Construction
Trades Council of California, AFL – CIO v. City of Vista.61 The Court held
that locally funded public works projects performed by chartered cities are
municipal affairs under the California Constitution. As a result, the wages
paid to workers on charter city projects are not subject to California’s
prevailing wage laws. In response, because it was not possible to overturn
the Vista court’s ruling with a constitutional amendment, labor activists in
California convinced the legislature to make it more difficult for charter law
cities to obtain state funding for public works projects. Senate Bill 7 (“SB
7”) prohibits the receipt or use of state funding or financial assistance for
construction projects by charter cities that allow contractors to not comply
with the state’s prevailing wage laws on a public works contract.62 While
there are minor exceptions for contracts under $25,000, the proposed law is
a reminder of the labor sector’s palpable influence on California politics,
despite a robust opposition by the League of California Cities on behalf of
local jurisdictions. In its letter opposing the legislation, the League wrote:

57. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 1100.7 (West 2016); Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A.
MacDonald Constr. Co., 71 Cal. App. 4th 38, 51 (1998); R & A Vending Servs. v. City of
L.A., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1191 (1985).
58. L.A. ADMIN. CODE, art. 11 (noting that it is the policy of the City of Los Angeles to
comply with the Living Wage Ordinance, including contractors and subcontractors who have
agreements with the City). See also San Jose City Council Res. 68554 (2013) (revised in
Resolution 68900) (“It is beneficial to the health and welfare of citizens of San Jose that all
workers are paid a wage which enables them to not live in poverty.”). The policy includes
“employers who are awarded service contracts for services that are provided directly to the
City.” Id.
59. Vial v. City of San Diego, 122 Cal. App. 3d. 346, 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
60. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 30.
61. 54 Cal. 4th 547 (2012).
62. S.B. 7, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013).
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[SB 7] will retroactively punish the voters and residents of 51 charter cities
[without prevailing wage provisions in their charters] for exercising their
right to vote on how city funds are spent by denying them access to any
state funding for public works . . . . By seeking to impose punitive
measures for decisions made by the voters of charter cities . . . [t]he
public’s faith in government will be shattered . . . .63

The League, and a majority of citizens in California, view legislation
similar to SB 7 as both an intrusion by the state into the affairs of
municipalities and an affront to their local control.64 Many local mayors and
council members argue that, while the state may decide to pay prevailing
wage rates for its contracts, the state should not impose this same burden on
local governments for local projects without providing funding for the
difference between market wages and prevailing wages. After all, the
provision for any municipal infrastructure is not a constitutionally protected
area and is the concern of the municipality and its taxpayers, who voted on
the specific charter to exclude prevailing wages. A clear definition of
municipal affairs from the California Supreme Court, by interpreting the
Municipal Affairs Clause of the California Constitution, would go a long
way in calming the two sides.65
III. CALIFORNIA’S GENERAL LAW CITIES AND STATE LAW
The California Government Code authorizes general law cities to use the
general laws of the state to govern themselves.66 Given the voluntary
adherence to these general laws by local governments and their constituents
when deciding to incorporate as a municipality, the dominance of state power
is less of a concern in this context but never ignored. Every California city
possesses the general power to “make and enforce within its limits all local,
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with
general laws.”67 For example, state law authorizes every city to be governed
by a city council of five members. Voters may choose a different number of
council members to serve the city, but five remains the norm throughout the
state.68 State law also establishes the positions of a city clerk, a city treasurer,

63. SB 7, LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, http://www.cacities.org/SB7 [https://perma.cc/H3C3ZTY4].
64. See Protecting Local Control through the Ballot Box, LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES,
https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Section/LegislativeResources/Presentations-Publications-Papers/Protecting-Local-Control-through-the-BallotBox-Fa [https://perma.cc/PU29-GH2Q] (citing Proposition 1A, approved by 83.7% of
California voters to protect local taxpayers and prevent the California Legislature from taking
and using local funds).
65. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5.
66. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34102 (West 1955).
67. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §7.
68. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 36501 (West 2001).
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a police chief, a fire chief, and any subordinate employees as necessary and
required by law.69 City elections, methods of elections, rules and procedures,
and qualifications of council members are all provided for by the state law.70
In stark contrast to charters, public funds may not be accepted or expended
by any candidate to run for public office.71 Relevant provisions of the
California Government Code address public office vacancies, council
member compensation, specific legislative authority, and quorum
requirements.72 State laws permit city voters to impose term limits for
council members.73 The charter city controversy regarding the payment of
prevailing wages on public works contracts is not an issue for general law
cities, as they must adhere to the requirements of the California Public
Contracting Code for all public contracts and must pay prevailing wages for
such contracts pursuant to the provisions of the California Labor Code.74
Finally, all land use and zoning ordinances in general law cities must be
consistent with the general plan for the city, as required by state statute.75 A
general plan is typically prepared locally but is subject to the approval of the
state, especially for housing. This is one area, for example, in which a
general law city cedes real control to the state.
However, local government officials, on behalf of their constituents,
always expect local control, even under general laws. These officials are
specifically elected to deliver a local quality of life to their constituents. The
expectations for local character is not one-size-fits-all in California, and,
therefore, the demands on each local government differ from city to city. For
example, a local equestrian concern with bridal trail safety and access in
Rolling Hills Estates, a semi-rural equestrian community, may not be a
concern at all in Torrance, a more urban suburb of Los Angeles, and a local
transportation concern in Torrance may not be a priority in Rolling Hills
Estates. For these very important constituency concerns and priorities, local
control remains extremely important for city sovereignty in its own
municipal governance structures. Because California courts have been
reluctant to infer legislative intent to preempt local laws, there is a strong

69. Id.
70. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 321 (West 2013); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10101 (West
1994); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34871 (West 1994).
71. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85300 (West 2001).
72. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1770 (West 2015); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 36502 (West
1995); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 36513 (West 1990); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 36516 (West 2010); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 36810 (West 1949); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 36934 (West 1993).
73. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 36502(b) (West 1995).
74. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1771 (West 1981); CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20162 (West
1982).
75. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65860 (West 1998).
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presumption that local ordinances are valid when there is a significant unique
city interest that may be different from another city.76
IV. INDEPENDENT, FULL SERVICE, AND CONTRACT CITIES
In addition to differing in the basis for their authority, California cities
also differ in their style of governance. While some cities are full-service or
independent cities, others are known as contract cities. As their name
suggests, full-service or independent cities provide, themselves, a broad base
of municipal services to their citizens. On the other hand, contract cities
deliver these municipal services through various contracts with other
governments and private and not-for-profit contractors.77 However, both
independent and contract cities are known to use strong mayor or council
manager forms of internal governance to manage their communities.
Although only a small minority of cities have strong mayors, most wellknown large cities in California, like Los Angeles, San Jose, San Francisco
and San Diego, are strong mayor cities. According to the Strong Mayor
Council Institute, sixty-eight percent of the largest United States cities with
over 600,000 people are strong mayor cities, and thirty-two percent use the
council manager form of governance. The percentages slightly change to
almost sixty percent and forty percent, respectively, when including cities
over 370,000 people.78 Most cities, whether independent or contract cities
and whether charter or general law-based, use the council-manager system.
According to the International City/County Management Association
(“ICMA”) the council-manager form is the most common form of city
government in the United States.79 The National League of Cities reports
that usage for this form of government has grown substantially, especially in
the Southeast and on the West Coast.80 The council-manager form
encourages engagement and dilutes the power of any single political special
interest group. Each council member possesses equal power. In the case of
a strong mayor, there is a consolidation of at least political power into the
mayor, who could, on behalf of a special interest group, attempt to dilute the

76. See City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., 56 Cal 4th
729, 742-44 (2013).
77. Frank V. Zerunyan & Peter Pirnejad, From Contract Cities to Mass Collaborative
Governance, AM. CITY & CTY. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://americancityandcounty.com/blog/
contract-cities-mass-collaborative-governance-0 [https://perma.cc/S3M7-AV6K].
78. 50 Largest Cities, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INST., http://strongmayorcouncil.org/50
largestcities.html [https://perma.cc/JAF7-C3ZM].
79. Council-Manager Form of Government: Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L
CITY/CTY. MGMT. ASS’N, http://www.icma.org/documents/document/document/2705
[https://perma.cc/P86H-TU9L].
80. Forms of Municipal Government, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/buildskills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-structures/forms-of-municipal-government
[https://perma.cc/5WZW-R9Z9].
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voices of the individual council members. In the council-manager form of
government, the chief executive in charge of the day-to-day activities of the
city is the professional city manager. This individual, like a chief executive
in the private sector, is responsible for implementing her council’s policies.
City managers are talented people with the education (typically a Masters of
Public Administration) and skills to manage the daily activities of the city
and, perhaps more importantly and unlike the private sector, to engage
citizens for the purpose of proposing responsive local policies to the city
council.81
In practice, whether a city delivers services through a contract or provides
those services in-house depends on the size of the city and the goals of its
constituency. For example, the city of Glendale, California, a full-service
and charter city of 200,000 inhabitants, delivers all police, fire,
transportation, public works, planning, and even some utility services with
its more than 1800 full time employees. The benefits of full-service delivery
for local governments include local and internal control over the way in
which services are delivered and provided. This delivery method can also
include greater flexibility in the distribution of staffing solutions during a
specific need or emergency. More importantly, cost-benefit analyses show
that, for Glendale’s size, full service may be more efficient and cheaper than
contracting for those services.82 The total cost of providing a service inhouse (the independent city or full-service city model) is the sum of its direct
costs plus a proportional share of organizational overhead, or indirect costs.
Pension, facility, and capital equipment costs are typically the largest direct
costs of an independent city. When direct and indirect costs in an
independent city are less than the sum of potential contract costs plus
contract administration costs, then the independent city model may make
financial sense over the contracting model, as experts determined in
Glendale.83
On the other hand, La Cañada Flintridge is a general law contract city of
approximately 20,000 inhabitants managed by twenty-five full-time
employees. La Cañada Flintridge contracts for most municipal services. It
obtains police, fire, public works, and animal control services from the
county of Los Angeles, utilities from semi-private organizations like
Southern California Edison, and trash-hauling services from the private
81. What Degree Do You Need to Become a City Manager?, LEARN.ORG,
http://learn.org/articles/What_Degree_Do_You_Need_to_Become_a_City_Manager.html
[https://perma.cc/HX5V-PWPX].
82. This Is My Glendale, CITY OF GLENDALE, CAL., http://www.glendaleca.gov/govern
ment/this-is-my-glendale [https://perma.cc/U3WZ-6YJP].
83. Lawrence Martin, How to Compare Costs Between In-House and Contract Services,
REASON FOUND. (Mar. 1993), http://reason.org/files/ba9b149031669883385db8c2ff63b
9ef.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VQN-QXPH].
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sector.84 Instead of being responsible for providing these services, the city
manager and employees of La Cañada Flintridge supervise and manage
them. The advantages of this model of delivery include efficiency and price,
reduction of pension liabilities by employing fewer full-time public
employees, limited liability in the delivery of products and services, and
access to a greater volume of resources and innovations.
Whether a city chooses the independent or contract model, pension
liabilities remain the biggest obstacle for local governments in this new era
of Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”) rules. These rules
became binding on states and local governments for fiscal years starting after
July 2014. GASB rules require the full disclosure of pension liabilities and
expenses to represent more transparently the full impact of these
obligations.85 These future obligations typically remain unfunded in
California, and, according to the state Controller’s office, California’s
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (“CAFR”) puts the net pension
liability at $63.7 billion as of June 2015.86 Therefore, municipal policy
bodies in California are more apprehensive than ever about pension liabilities
and adding to those liabilities.
V. THE LAKEWOOD PLAN FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONTRACT CITY 87
Although contract cities have historically collaborated horizontally with
other municipal governments, today’s contracting model expands the scope
of collaboration vertically, involving service providers outside of
government in the private or not-for-profit sector.
This collaboration delivers statutorily defined special municipal services
in finance, economy, accounting, engineering, administration, and law,
creating an efficient system for public administration. In this context of the
California contracting model according to the Government Code, two
relevant statutes facilitate extra- and intra-sector collaboration. California
Government Code Section 37103 explicitly provides special services in
stating that a city “may contract with any specially trained and experienced
person, firm or corporation for special services and advice in financial,
84. See generally CITY OF LA CAÑADA FLINTRIDGE, http://www.lcf.ca.gov/ [https://perma.
cc/W3S6-KGTU].
85. William G. Gale & Aaron Krupkin, Financing State and Local Pension Obligations:
Issues and Options, THE BROOKINGS INST. (July 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/Financing-State-and-Local-Pension-Obligations-Gale-Krupkin1.pdf [perma.cc/E9KA-KERE]; Pension Standards for State and Local Governments,
GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BD., http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASB
SectionPage&cid=1176163528472 [https://perma.cc/V94N-9DW6].
86. Press Release, Cal. State Controller’s Office, CA Controller Publishes
Comprehensive Annual Fin. Report (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_
17124.html [https://perma.cc/H4HY-X4PD].
87. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77.
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economic, accounting, engineering, legal, or administrative matters.”88
California Government Code Section 53060 allows the legislative body of
any public or municipal corporation or district to “contract with and employ
any persons for the furnishing to the corporation or district special services
and advice in financial, economic, accounting, engineering, legal, or
administrative matters if such persons are specially trained and experienced
and competent to perform the special services required.”89
Although, arguably, all cities engage in contracting, the designation as
contract cities has a special and historical meaning in California. The postWorld War II era ushered in a new style of public administration led by men
and women, labeled the Greatest Generation by journalist Tom Brokaw.90
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 – commonly referred to as the
GI Bill – is still one of the most significant pieces of United States federal
government legislation of all time.91 The GI Bill impacted the nation
socially, economically, and politically. Helping veterans assimilate into civil
society was a brilliant move by the federal government, a move that sparked
community-building, education, innovation, and the development of giant
industries. Western regions, particularly Southern California, immensely
benefit to this day from this federal policy, which, through educated WWII
veterans, is responsible for the development and advancement of the defense
and aerospace industries in Los Angeles County. These two industries
employ high-wage earners facilitating the economic development of many
cities surrounding the Los Angeles Air Force Base. Some communities,
including the Palos Verdes Peninsula, have thrived since the early fifties
because of the job opportunities with companies like Raytheon and Northrop
Grumman, which are industry leaders in space, missile-development, and
military technologies.92
Using the benefits of the GI Bill, the Greatest Generation purchased
homes in various communities throughout the nation and attended local
colleges and universities where they excelled in disciplines like engineering,
entrepreneurship, medicine, business, and law. This level of education
substantially improved the earning capacity of each participating service
member, uplifting the middle class and establishing a sustainable upper
middle class.93
88. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 37013 (West 1941).
89. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53060 (West 1941).
90. TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION 11 (1998).
91. History and Timeline, U.S. VA, http://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/history.asp
[https://perma.cc/Z3L7-CDEV].
92. The U.S. Defense Industry and Arms Sales, STAN. UNIV., https://web.stanford.
edu/class/e297a/U.S.%20Defense%20Industry%20and%20Arms%20Sales.htm
[https://perma.cc/K8SZ-V87U].
93. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77.
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This economic base was the recipe for city and community building in
Southern California. After a long hiatus of city incorporation in Los Angeles
County going back to 1939, the unincorporated area immediately adjacent to
the established city of Long Beach, California, was one community ready to
make history. This area ten miles southeast of Los Angeles blazed new trails
literally and figuratively when, based on demand, the Lakewood Park
Company developed one of the first post-World War II era planned
communities, which consisted of 17,500 homes on over 3500 acres of land,
including landscapes, streets with lights, and underground sewers and wires.
Reminiscent of the success of Levittown in Nassau County, New York,
unincorporated Lakewood grew to 70,000 residents in the first few years of
the 1950s, using slogans such as “Lakewood – My Home Town” and
“Lakewood, Tomorrow’s City Today.”94
In April of 1954, the Lakewood communities, under threat of annexation
from the City of Long Beach, incorporated as the state’s 16th-largest city and
the largest community in the United States ever to incorporate as a sovereign
city.95 What was remarkable about this incorporation was not the necessity
or the actual decision to become a city but, rather, the decision made by city
founders on the financially sound and efficient method to administer the
city.96 A poster child of the GI Bill, as a graduate of USC Law School, John
Sanford Todd advised the city founders to use an existing statute of the
California Government Code and a section of the county charter to
collaborate with the county government and contract for the delivery of
municipal services in young Lakewood.97
Although the original motive behind Lakewood’s incorporation was to
retain local control over local services, the purpose of what became known
as the Lakewood Plan was to eliminate duplication of services and rely on
government service providers to deliver public administration in a cost
effective manner.98 This innovative and transformational plan not only
earned the City of Lakewood prominence in the history of American
municipalities, it also became the model for forty-one additional
communities in Los Angeles County and more than 130 communities across

94. Lakewood Community History, CTY. OF L.A. PUB. LIBRARY, http://www.colapublib.
org/history/lakewood/ [https://perma.cc/RL97-Q3JE].
95. Birth of a City, CITY OF LAKEWOOD, CAL. (Oct. 10, 2015), http://lakewoodcity.org/
about/history/history/ch4.asp [https://perma.cc/R945-WEKV].
96. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77.
97. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51301 (West); L.A. CTY. CHARTER § 56 ½–¾.
98. John S. Todd - The Father of the Lakewood Plan, CITY OF LAKEWOOD, CAL.,
http://www.lakewoodcity.org/about/history/johnstodd.asp [https://perma.cc/HUQ8-XBX5]
(last updated July 7, 2014).
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the state in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.99 Like Lakewood, these
communities selected the model to retain a level of sovereignty or local
control within their borders, through collaboration with the county, the
private sector, and the not-for-profit sector.
This engaged governance model of the Lakewood Plan, or contract cities,
encourages the public and private sectors to jointly study experience and
solve policy and public administration challenges. This network of intersectoral actors provides the best setting for professionals to work together
for the public interest. While the motivation of each sector may be different,
the collective end result benefits the public. The Plan emerged from a
“perfect storm of conditions.”100 These conditions included the demographic
changes in the county (especially in the number of residents and
socioeconomic status), the necessity to grow communities like Lakewood,
and the incentives to participate in collaborations by both the county and
newly developed cities to share revenue and provide more efficient nonduplicative services. The social and human capital, as well as the facilitative
leadership skills of people like John Sanford Todd, may not be
underestimated for the success of the collaboration and the Lakewood
Plan.101
To preserve the innovation in the Lakewood Plan and the usefulness of
the model for like-minded jurisdictions, eight cities gathered on November
20, 1957 to form the California Contract Cities Association (“CCCA”).102
The like-minded cities were: Lakewood, Bellflower, Duarte, La Puente,
Norwalk, Paramount, Rolling Hills, and Santa Fe Springs.103 The first bylaws of the CCCA were drafted in 1958.104 By the early 1960s, the CCCA
had drawn twenty-five members across the county to help organize new
cities preserving the contracting model. Half a century later, CCCA, with
just under seventy member cities, still nurtures this network of cities through
educational seminars and information designed to build and improve human
capacity among its constituency in order to help them better serve their

99. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77. See generally Frequent Questions, CAL. ASS’N
OF LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMM’NS, http://www.calafco.org/index.php/lafco-law/whatis-lafco/faq-calafco [https://perma.cc/9LE7-TWT7].
100. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77. See generally The Lakewood Plan, CITY OF
LAKEWOOD, CAL., http://lakewoodcity.org/about/history/lakewoodplan/ [https://perma.cc/VT
6D-2FRH] (last updated Oct. 20, 2014).
101. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51301 (West); L.A. CTY. CHARTER § 56 ½–¾.
102. History, CAL. CONTRACT CITIES ASS’N, http://www.contractcities.org/about/history/
[https://perma.cc/CN8V-F6VD].
103. Id.
104. Id.
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communities.105 The network efficiently, and in large numbers, advocates
for interests common to member cities. Finally, the network provides access
to service providers, building social capital along the way to create value for
member cities.
The Lakewood Plan was controversial, as it did not fit the mold of best
practices of state centered bureaucracy in public administration, which had
become popular in the early 1900s.106 Even today some argue that the
contracting model prevents larger forms of government, such as county
governments, from providing services to all.107 However, neither the
practice nor the data supports this argument.
In practice the County of Los Angeles still receives the lion’s share of
local taxes and is reimbursed fully for all services it provides to cities.108
Most, if not all, cities in Los Angeles County provide more direct and
certainly better quality municipal services to their constituents than to
unincorporated areas of the county.109 All public safety infrastructure built
by the county in the early 1950s is used by cities that contract for public
safety services. Instead of duplicative police services, for example, the Los
Angeles County Sheriff Department provides public safety services to fortytwo out of eighty-eight total incorporated cities in the county.110 The Sheriff
department’s annual revenue from these contracting cities and other contract
law enforcement programs surpasses $850 million.111
Established contracting law in the state allows the County Sheriff
Department to recover the costs associated with each jurisdiction it serves,

105. Member Cities, CAL. CONTRACT CITIES ASS’N, http://www.contractcities.org/about/
member-cities/ [https://perma.cc/8R9W-9EP2].
106. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77.
107. Question and Answer Session at the Fordham Urban Law Journal Symposium (Apr.
7, 2016).
108. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51350 (West 1983); Therese A. McCarty et al., Allocating
Property Tax Revenue in California: Living with Proposition 13, 94th Nat’l Tax Ass’n, at 76
(2001).
109. Unincorporated Los Angeles County, L.A. CTY. DEP’T OF REG’L PLAN.,
http://planning.lacounty.gov/view/unincorporated_los_angeles_county/
[https://perma.cc/
CNB2-4AWA] (last updated Oct. 22, 2015); see also Howard Beckman, Delivery of
Municipal Services in Unincorporated Communities: White Paper for the Eden Area
Livability Initiative (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.acgov.org/board/district4/eali/documents/
EALIwhitepaperonmunicipalservices.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BTU-4NFJ].
110. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, City of Sierra Madre Municipal Law Enforcement
Services Proposal (2015); Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, City of Vernon Municipal Law
Enforcement Services Proposal (2012).
111. About Us, L.A. CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, http://shq.lasdnews.net/pages/PageDetail.
aspx?id=2181 [https://perma.cc/BU4G-QURS]; Budget Information, CTY. OF L.A., CAL.,
http://ceo.lacounty.gov/budget.htm [https://perma.cc/RDJ7-ADDR]; Municipal Police
Services, L.A. CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, http://shq.lasdnews.net/pages/PageDetail.aspx?id=
2180 [https://perma.cc/YWJ2-TK9X].
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and most California Counties receive the largest tranche of a city’s revenue.
Specifically, in the case of Rolling Hills Estates, property tax is apportioned
24.3% to the County of Los Angeles, 41.1% to state and local education,
including 20.1% to the local Palos Verdes School District, 18% to the Los
Angeles County Fire District, 10.1% to various special districts like the
library and community colleges, and 6.7% to the city of Rolling Hills
Estates.112 Admittedly, some cities in California receive a better share in a
larger range of the total property tax collected in their city.113 Sales tax, the
second largest source of city revenues, is also apportioned to substantially
benefit the state rather than cities. While some cities receive up to thirteen
percent of sales tax dollars in their city, most cities see less than this amount
as their share of sales tax revenue.114 The City of Rolling Hills Estates
receives less than seven percent.115 Last but not least, the County of Los
Angeles is the largest recipient of contract city expenditures in fire, police,
and public works. These expenditures are typically the largest for any city
using the contracting model. Despite the conflict perceived by some that
contract cities act at odds with counties, the county enjoys a very
collaborative working relationship with each contract city through each
supervisorial district. Contract cities are, therefore, not a liability to the
County of Los Angeles in terms of revenues and expenditures but solid
partners in delivering accountable public administration throughout the
county. This partnership is further solidified by each supervisor in Los
Angeles County who represents several contract cities in her supervisorial
district.116
The contracting model, set out in the Lakewood Plan, maximizes local
control to create fully sovereign cities, sometimes with as little as a few

112. Finance, CITY OF ROLLING HILLS EST., http://www.ci.rolling-hills-estates.ca.us/
index.aspx?page=96 [https://perma.cc/8F7Z-FAYS].
113. See generally Understanding the Basics of Municipal Revenues in California: Cities,
Counties, and Special Districts, INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, www.ca-ilg.org/document/understa
nding-basics-county-and-city-revenues [https://perma.cc/G6TN-FMJL] (last updated 2013);
Understanding California’s Property Taxes, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/tax/property-tax-primer-112912.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Z8YS-CX5J].
114. See generally Budgetary/Legal Basis Annual Report, CAL. ST. CONTROLLER’S OFFICE
(Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-ARD/BudLeg/blbar1415.pdf [https://perma.cc/
T85C-FMP8]; Local Revenue Fund 2011 Reconciliation, 2016-17 Fiscal Year, CAL. STATE
CONTROLLER’S OFF., http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-ARD-Payments/Local_Revenue_2011_Re
con_1617fy.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQR3-N64M].
115. See generally Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, ADMIN. SERVS. DEP’T, CITY
OF ROLLING HILLS EST. (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.ci.rolling-hills-estates.ca.us/Mod
ules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=14626 [https://perma.cc/6K6Y-5W7V].
116. See Fourth Supervisorial District Map, CTY. OF L.A., CAL. http://ceo.lacounty.gov/
forms/4th%20Map.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2EK-M3XM]; SUPERVISOR DON KNABE,
http://knabe.com [https://perma.cc/B6M9-CND2].
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hundred residents.117
It increases efficiency and addresses local
demographic problems, allowing cities to scale contracted services to their
particular needs, rather than staffing a large municipal bureaucracy, and with
the support of the California Contract Cities Association. This network
provides the framework for future collaborations in public administration
and public policy. Cultivating different motivations of actors in various
sectors for the delivery of a common mission is the hallmark of this
successful collaboration model.118
VI. CITY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
The contracting model and any municipal public administration
contemplate the provision of municipal services under the responsibility and
supervision of an elected city council, the policymaking body of the city.
The city council retains and exercises all legislative and executive powers
under California law.119 The city council sets the limits and parameters of
services to be provided and approves the contracts to support those services.
While the actual delivery of the service may be contracted to a more efficient
and effective provider of the service, the policy and the responsibility that
comes with it is never outsourced.120
City councils are transparently accountable to their citizens for the
delivery of all municipal services, contracted or not.121 To assist in these
responsibilities, the city council appoints a city clerk, a city treasurer, and a
city manager (though in some cities these functions are performed by elected
officials as well).122 The supporting cast of department heads and staff, like
a director of planning or director of parks and activities, to mention a few,
117. See CITY OF BRADBURY, http://www.cityofbradbury.org [https://perma.cc/45BXUK67]; CITY OF INDUSTRY, http://www.cityofindustry.org [https://perma.cc/VQ6H-29QE].
118. For centuries, certainly since the founding of the United States, governance at the
most local level experienced varying traditions of service delivery. The contract city model
has been a rewarding innovation for California. However, as with any governance innovation,
it is not a “one size fits all,” even in California. Whether a public organization should pursue
this style of governance depends greatly on the local culture, available human capital, and
possible cost benefits to govern. Further, today’s technology is becoming more and more
complex, requiring public managers to bring a new level sophistication in assessment and
management. Innovations in information and global positioning technologies, drones,
driverless cars, robots, and social media will undoubtedly change the governance landscape
of tomorrow’s municipal corporation.
119. See Council-Manager Form Resource Package, INT’L CITY/CTY. MGMT. ASS’N,
http://icma.org/en/Page/100086/CouncilManager_Form_Resource_Package
[https://perma.cc/7RKB-5S6M]; NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 80.
120. See Types and Responsibilities of Local Agencies, INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T (Aug. 8,
2012), http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/who_does_what.pdf [https://
perma.cc/72DV-WBUY].
121. See generally id.
122. See generally What is a City Clerk?, CITY CLERKS ASS’N OF CAL.,
http://www.californiacityclerks.org/what-is-a-city-clerk [https://perma.cc/E79C-TBBN].
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are hired by the city manager, who is directly and solely responsible for their
performance. Most contract cities are council-manager and general law
cities, which deliver efficient and effective municipal services to their
constituents.123
By way of example, the City of Rolling Hills Estates, California is
organized like any other typical general law and contract city.124 This city
of semi-rural equestrian character with a little more than 8000 residents
provides a wide range of municipal services, including administrative,
building, public safety, public works, and other related and necessary
services just like any other city, but it does so, in large part, through
contracting with other government agencies, private firms, nonprofit
organizations, and, most importantly, individual volunteers as citizens
engaged for change. In the tradition of the city since its incorporation in
1957, all elected and appointed public officials who reside in the city serve
the city on a volunteer basis.125

The city manager in Rolling Hills Estates, the assistant city manager, and
every department head, aside from their administrative duties as hired staff,
manage a contract for the delivery of municipal services within their specific

123. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 80.
124. See CITY OF ROLLING HILLS EST., http://www.ci.rolling-hills-estates.ca.us
[https://perma.cc/5F9T-769M].
125. The graphic below provides a visual of Rolling Hills’ management structure. See
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, ADMIN. SERVS. DEP’T, CITY OF ROLLING HILLS EST.
(Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.ci.rolling-hills-estates.ca.us/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx? do
cumentid=14626 [https://perma.cc/NDF8-82AZ].
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area of expertise and practice.126 The city manager typically manages public
safety contracts (police, fire, and paramedics) with the County of Los
Angeles, and the city attorney contracts with a private sector lawyer. The
assistant city manager is in charge of all public-works-related contracts with
the county, services like animal control, and private contracts for waste
management, roads (building and maintenance), traffic, and safety. The
planning director reviews and manages contracts with county building and
safety, as well as private sector planners, land use consultants, and engineers.
The administrative services director, serving also as the treasurer, typically
oversees information technologies, human resources, and accounting
activities through various contracts with the private sector. The community
services director oversees contracts with the private sector relating to
equestrian and other recreational concerns, including the municipal stables,
parks, and trails. Shareholder-owned utilities provide services for gas,
electricity, and water. Most administrative services remain in the city hall,
including a small planning staff to process planning applications. A few
California special districts,127 created by the local Palos Verdes Peninsula
community to meet special needs, participate in the overall delivery of
services. These services include a separate school district, a library district,
and joint-powers authority to deliver transportation services in the city and
the surrounding Palos Verdes Peninsula.
VII. UNIFORM LAWS GUIDING MUNICIPALITIES
A certain amount of human capital is necessary to manage contract and
full-service or independent cities. To guide this management, fairly uniform
laws and rules govern procedures, conduct, and decorum in city councils and
in city halls across California. These include the Ralph Brown Act (“Brown
Act”), the Political Reform Act of 1974 (“Act”), and the Act’s implementing
rules promulgated by the Fair Political Practices Commission (“FPPC”).128
The FPPC has jurisdiction over all city governments, whether charter or
general law.129 These significant pieces of legislation underscore the

126. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 80.
127. See PALOS VERDES LIBRARY DIST., http://www.pvld.org [https://perma.cc/MH93ATWL]; PALOS VERDES PENINSULA TRANSIT AUTH., http://www.palosverdes.com/pvtransit
[https://perma.cc/WXT7-XV7H]; PALOS VERDES PENINSULA UNIFIED SCH. DIST.,
http://www.pvpusd.net [https://perma.cc/L4LZ-275Q]; Special Districts, CAL. SPECIAL
DISTS. ASS’N, http://www.csda.net/special-districts/ [https://perma.cc/4FMW-PP9M]; Types
and Responsibilities of Local Agencies, INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T (Aug. 8, 2012),
http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/who_does_what.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RXH3-W59Q].
128. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950.5 et seq. (West 2016); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81000 et
seq. (West 2016). See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3500 et seq. (West 2016).
129. See CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, www.fppc.ca.gov [https://perma.cc/K3S5CHL3].
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emphasis in American law on transparency in municipal government and
illustrate how progressive California is on the topic. The preamble of the
Brown Act describes public service at this level as well as the people’s
expectations in the conduct of the people’s business:
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which
serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public
servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what
is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so
that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.130

This preamble and the Brown Act itself shine a positive light on the
municipal enterprise; nothing is a secret in deciding the people’s business.
Local public officials in trouble with the law and the rules tend to forget this
golden rule. California has had painful experiences in the cities of Bell,
South Gate, Maywood, and others.131 New and good leaders in those cities
are learning how difficult it is to recover from the violation of the golden rule
by their predecessors, who are for the most part serving time in prison.
Highlighting the importance of transparency also assists public officials
in avoiding conflicts of interest in the exercise of their responsibilities as
public servants. Conflicts of interest for municipal office holders under
California law can arise in a variety of ways and are governed by a myriad
of laws, including the common law conflict of interest doctrine developed
through precedential court decisions and statutory conflict of interest
rules.132 The common law doctrine provides that a public officer is impliedly
bound to exercise the powers conferred on her with disinterested zeal and
diligence and primarily for the benefit of the public. Public officers are
obligated by virtue of their office to discharge their responsibilities with
integrity and fidelity and are prohibited from placing themselves in a position

130. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2016).
131. See Hector Becerra & Sam Allen, Cudahy Arrests Add Salt to L.A. County Area`s
Civic Wounds, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/24/local/lame-06-23-southeast-corruption-20120624 [https://perma.cc/584J-WHB2]; Bell Scandal: A
Times Investigation, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016, 8:58 AM), http://www.latimes.com
/local/bell/la-me-bell-scandal-a-times-investigation-20160211-storygallery.html
[https://perma.cc/LM53-YE83] (lack of transparency and engagement led to the conviction
of various public officials in Bell); Ruben Vives & Kim Christensen, Why the City of
Maywood Is Facing a State Audit and a Probe by the District Attorney, L.A. TIMES (May 13,
2016, 2:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-maywood-20160513-story.
html [https://perma.cc/NG3J-GT7Z].
132. See generally The Political Reform Act, CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N,
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/the-law/the-political-reform-act.html
[https://perma.cc/N7GBE5RC].
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where their private, personal interest may conflict with their official
duties.133
In addition to the common law doctrine, California has codified the
prohibition against public officials’ self-dealing in contracts since the 1850s.
This prohibition is commonly known as the Section 1090 prohibition and
provides that public officials cannot be financially interested in any contract
they made in their official capacity or by the body of which they are
members.134 The ramifications of violating this law are quite serious. A
contract made in violation of Section 1090 subjects the officer to a fine or
imprisonment and to a perpetual disqualification from holding office in
California. Moreover, the contract is unenforceable and may be void.135 In
the context of the contracting model, the common law and this codified
prohibition, and its intentionally harsh violation consequences, assure the
fair administration of the model.
More recently, the California Legislature enacted the Political Reform Act
of 1974 to ensure that public officials in charter and general law cities
perform their duties in an impartial manner.136 The Act provides that no
public official can make, participate in making, or attempt to use her official
position to influence a governmental decision if she knows or has reason to
know that she has a financial interest in the decision.137 The purpose of the
Act is to ensure that public servants who are entrusted with the privilege of
conducting the public’s business do so in a manner that promotes an orderly
system of public administration. The FPPC implements and promulgates
rules associated with the Act.138 These rules are the public’s minimum
expectations from its public officials tasked with managing charter or
contract cities. The Commission is responsible for prosecuting violations of
these rules.
VIII. TAX MATTERS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Tax and municipal financing matters have been infamous in California
due to political battles over tax measures in the 1970s. A complete
understanding of the legal authority for these matters can be complex and is
outside the purview of this article. Generally speaking, however, the
California Supreme Court has said “[t]he provisions on taxation in the state
133. See Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal. App. 2d 198, 206 (1956); Noble v. City of Palo Alto,
89 Cal. App. 47, 51 (1928).
134. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1090 (West 2015).
135. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1092 (West 2008).
136. See Terry, 143 Cal. App. 2d. at 206; Noble, 89 Cal. App. at 51.
137. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 87100 (West 1975); CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, supra note
129.
138. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 83112 (West 1975); CAL. FAIR POL. PRACS. COMM’N, supra note
129.
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Constitution are a limitation on the power of the Legislature rather than a
grant to it.”139 These limitations exist in Article XIII A of the California
Constitution, affectionately known as Proposition 13 of 1974, which
continues to be subject to support and scrutiny from differing organizations
in the state.140 A less known taxing initiative is Proposition 218, which was
enacted in 1996 to ensure that all taxes and most charges on property owners
are subject to voter approval.141 Both of these tax measures may result in
reduced revenues to the state and municipalities, but they achieve an
important purpose for the California electorate, placing the power to tax
squarely within the discretion of the taxed at the local level. Both charter
law cities and general law cities enjoy these powers within the limitations of
the California Constitution and Proposition 218, even though a charter city’s
authority to levy taxes comes from the municipal affairs clause of the
California Constitution, while a general law city’s authority is written in
statute.142 The limiting constitutional provisions apply to each of
California’s more than 7000 cities, counties, special districts, schools,
community colleges, and regional organizations.143 These limitations in
concept mirror the intent of the California Constitution to drive power away
from the state, especially on local affairs.
Because tax revenue is typically associated with improvements in a given
city, several finance laws attempt to fill the revenue gap created by
Propositions 13 and 218. The Improvement Act of 1911, Municipal
Improvement Act of 1913, Improvement Bond Act of 1915, Landscaping
and Lighting Act of 1972, Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982,
and several other related statutory schemes, such as infrastructure finance
districts and enhanced infrastructure finance districts, allow cities in
California to finance public infrastructure.144 S.B. 628 was signed into law
in 2014 to address the abolition of the Redevelopment Law, which funded
public infrastructures since 1945.145 The bill created enhanced infrastructure

139. Delaney v. Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561, 568 (1944).
140. Stephen Moore, Proposition 13 Then, Now and Forever, CATO INST. (July 30, 1998),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/proposition-13-then-now-forever
[https://perma.cc/B2KU-FGX2].
141. Understanding Proposition 218, LEGIS. ANALYST`S OFF., CAL. STATE LEGIS. (Dec.
1996), http://www.lao.ca.gov/1996/120196_prop_218/understanding_prop218_1296.html
[https://perma.cc/Q59M-9XGM].
142. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 37100.5 (West 1985).
143. LEGIS. ANALYST`S OFF., CAL. STATE LEGIS., supra note 141.
144. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 8570, 10100.2, 22662 (West 1984); CAL. GOV’T CODE §
54703.1 (West 1982).
145. Frank V. Zerunyan, The Demise of California Redevelopment Law, and the
Repackaging of Tax Increments for California Municipalities, PUBLICCEO (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.publicceo.com/2015/03/the-demise-of-california-redevelopment-law-and-the-re
packaging-of-tax-increments-for-california-municipalities/ [https://perma.cc/W4B4-EF2Z].
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finance districts (“EIFDs”), new governmental entities governed by a public
financing authority made up of local elected officials. The purpose of the
EIFDs is to develop and implement an infrastructure-financing plan using
tax increments to build and finance public facilities.
In short, these special state financing acts and entities are flexible tools
used by local government agencies to pay for improvements and services in
public areas for both charter and general law cities. Applicable public
services may include streets, water projects, sewage and drainage, electricity
infrastructures, parks, and police protection to newly developing areas. As
forms of benefit assessments, the acts are based on the concept of assessing
only those properties that benefit from improvements financed, either
directly or indirectly, through increased property values. Charter and general
law cities have used these localized tools in order to build much-needed
infrastructure in their cities to relieve some of the tensions created by the
repeal of the redevelopment law in California.146
CONCLUSION
Aristotle once argued that true democracy could only flourish in small
political organizations. His view was that humans flourish best within a city
“since it alone provides the environment within which we can realize our
natural potential for practical reason, by actively engaging in public
affairs.”147 This concept serves to abolish physical constraints to
accommodate an assembly of citizens in a direct democracy, hence
Montesquieu’s claim that “it is natural for a republic to have only a small
territory.”148
Influenced by these and other political philosophers, the drafters of the
U.S. Constitution created American federalism, which prescribes a balance
of two complimentary strands of power, one horizontal, among equal
branches of government, and the other vertical, among states, counties, and
cities. The purpose behind these strands of power was to protect the
individual and the liberties she enjoyed under the Constitution. Madison
wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all the objects, which in the ordinary course of

146. Frank V. Zerunyan, Building Public Spaces Two Leases at a Time, PUBLICCEO (Feb.
25, 2016), http://www.publicceo.com/2016/02/building-public-spaces-two-leases-at-a-time/
[https://perma.cc/QF5R-64M9].
147. RICHARD BELLAMY & ANGUS ROSS, A TEXTUAL INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY 36 (Manchester Univ. Press 1996).
148. MONTESQUIEU, ESSAYS ON THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (David W. Carrithers & Toby
Linden eds., 1977).
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affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.149

Madison was, and still is, right. This vertical system of administration
divides authority among manageable units or in small political organizations.
It allows problems to be solved on the level where the problem originates—
in other words, it allows the government closest to the people to promptly
and efficiently address the needs of the people it serves.
Much has been written on the efficiency and responsiveness of local
governance. More than fifty percent of the world population already lives in
cities, and that number is said to increase to seventy percent by 2030.150
Cities are home to people who live and die in them. Cities are the main
incubator of the most important innovations in technology, culture, policy,
and administration.151 With the exception of very large cities, where things
are less manageable and more political, city mayors and council members
are our neighbors and friends. They see each other at the local little league,
the youth soccer field, the grocery store, and the local bank. They are
responsive and accountable to citizens, face to face and on a regular basis.
They are typically non-partisan. As such, their decisions are more pragmatic
and aimed at solving problems rather than towing a party line. This reality
recalls the famous words of Mayor LaGuardia of New York, reminding
mayors and council members that “there is no Democratic or Republican
way of fixing a sewer.”152 In practice, this should remain the mantra of every
local government official focused on good and responsive governance.153

149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
150. Frank V. Zerunyan & M. Caroline Stevens, Social and Environmental Sustainable
Urbanization: Guidelines for Meaningful Progress, COMM. OF EXPERTS ON PUB. ADMIN.
(2014).
151. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD 14, 166, 214 (Yale Univ. Press
2014).
152. If Mayors Ruled the World, BENJAMINBARBER.ORG, http://benjaminbarber.org/
books/if-mayors-ruled-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/VB75-6S6U].
153. This article is dedicated to all local elected officials with whom I served. I also
dedicate this article to Sam Olivito, the long-time and now-retired executive director of
California Contract Cities Association, the Cities of Lakewood and Rolling Hills Estates, and
my colleagues at USC Price, who tirelessly advance the scholarship of local governance.

